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broader context of the Mediterranean 
naval war. If that war’s object was 
communications, the Germans 
achieved the majority of the tactical 
successes that produced operational 
and strategic consequences. Even 
according to O’Hara’s data, 82 percent 
of Allied losses during the period of 
Six Victories resulted from German 
actions (p. 259). Second Sirte is a 
clear example of this; the delay the 
Italian surface forces imposed was 
not decisive, because it was German 
aircraft that sank the enemy ships. 
Despite this, O’Hara concludes that 
the three Italian victories led to 
Axis maritime control of the central 
Mediterranean up to November 1942, 
broken only by the coming of Ameri-
can naval reinforcements (p. 257).
This conclusion is not convincing. 
First, it seems to confound surface 
predominance with maritime control. 
During summer–fall 1942, intelligence, 
air, and underwater predominance—
critical elements of maritime control 
during World War II—were in the 
hands of the British, enabling them to 
disrupt Axis communications despite 
enemy surface predominance. Second, 
this trend already was emerging 
during the first period considered 
by Six Victories (fall 1941). Current 
Anglo-American and Italian scholarly 
work agrees that the increased security 
of Axis transports during early 1942 
depended on the decline of Malta as an 
operative base, itself caused by increas-
ing German air attacks. O’Hara seems 
unable to shake this argument, because 
he only identifies a chronological con-
nection in the improved situation of 
the Axis convoys after the three Italian 
victories (p. 127), possibly mistaking 
correlation for causation. Surface 
preponderance, the main result of the 
Italian victories, could not stop air and 
submarine attacks against Axis con-
voys, Britain’s primary weapons against 
enemy communications, which indeed 
regained their momentum when Ger-
man airpower shifted from the central 
Mediterranean to assist Rommel.
In conclusion, O’Hara’s book offers a 
detailed reconstruction of the naval 
actions described, deserving credit 
for proving that the effectiveness of 
the Italian navy at a tactical level was 
better than Anglo-American studies 
usually have acknowledged. Less 
convincing is the analysis of the 
operational and strategic consequences 
of the six “victories,” owing to an over-
emphasis on surface warfare, which 
was only a part—and possibly not the 
most important one—of the Mediter-
ranean naval scenario in 1941–42. 
Readers searching this book for lessons 
relevant to modern antiaccess warfare 
will need to bear this in mind.
FABIO DE NINNO
On War and Politics: The Battlefield inside Wash-
ington’s Beltway, by Arnold L. Punaro, with Da-
vid Poyer. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2016. 249 pages. $29.95.
On War and Politics is a remarkable 
autobiography. It explores the life 
and professional careers of Arnold L. 
Punaro, a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 
(USMCR) major general and congres-
sional insider; it also is a remarkable 
portrayal of the day-to-day workings 
of Congress and the Pentagon, so it 
will appeal to a broad range of readers 
interested in national-security affairs. 
Punaro spent over thirty-five years as 
a USMCR officer and worked closely 
with the chairman of the Senate Armed 
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Services Committee, Senator Samuel A. 
Nunn Jr. (D-GA), for almost twenty-four 
years. Nunn played an important role 
in almost every major piece of defense 
legislation and understood the intrica-
cies of power politics inside the Beltway.
Punaro grew up a devout Roman 
Catholic, and as a young boy entered 
the seminary to become a priest, but 
eventually left and attended Spring Hill 
College for his undergraduate degree. 
On graduation, he started talking to 
military recruiters to avoid the draft, be-
cause his father warned him, “You don’t 
want to get drafted. You’ll go to Asia 
as an infantryman, and there’s nothing 
grand and glorious about war” (p. 18). 
Punaro was particularly impressed by 
the sharp uniform the Marine recruiter 
wore, so he decided to join the Corps.
Punaro’s dry wit and sense of humor 
are evident throughout the book. 
Describing his experiences during 
Officer Candidate School (OCS) at 
Quantico, he writes, “After being 
shouted into a haphazard queue, I began 
my introduction to the three eternal 
truths in the military: hurry up and 
wait, endless paperwork, and constant 
changes to ‘the word.’” Punaro excelled 
at OCS and the Basic School, and after 
graduation got his “dream job”: orders to 
Vietnam as an infantry platoon leader.
Punaro’s combat tour in Vietnam shaped 
the course of his subsequent life. Punaro 
starts the book with an incident in which 
he almost died. “None of us would come 
back the same. Some wouldn’t come 
back at all, especially from my area of 
operation, which held the dubious dis-
tinction of having the most casualties of 
any in the combat zone” (p. 26). Punaro 
learned well the leadership lessons of 
an infantry platoon leader in Vietnam. 
“We grew to respect each other, and 
my Marines gained confidence in my 
leadership for two primary reasons: 
I never got lost, and they knew that 
I wouldn’t put them in more danger 
than absolutely necessary” (p. 50).
After nearly four months in Vietnam—
almost all in the field—Punaro was 
seriously wounded. One of his fellow 
Marines, Corporal Roy Lee Hammonds, 
attempted to help Punaro but was killed 
in the firefight. “I had no doubt that the 
bullets that had torn through his protec-
tive gear would have ripped me to shreds 
had he not thrown himself between 
me and the snipers” (p. 55). Punaro 
was medevaced to a naval hospital in 
Okinawa. He always has remembered 
Hammonds’s actions that day.
On his return from Vietnam, Punaro 
was assigned to Marine Corps Base 
Quantico and became involved in 
planning social events for the training 
battalion. His wit and humor show 
when he describes the art of doing so 
in cooperation with officers’ wives. 
“It was an early lesson in Washington 
ways: if you don’t mind kissing some 
butts, you can go far” (p. 62).
After leaving the active-duty Marine 
Corps, Punaro entered the University 
of Georgia’s Grady School of Journal-
ism. He excelled in his graduate 
studies and was offered a job with 
Senator Nunn. “Little did I know that 
I was signing up for a decade’s tour 
on Nunn’s personal staff, and then 
another fourteen years on the Armed 
Services Committee[—]nearly a 
quarter-century with the Senate and the 
senator, in one way or another” (p. 72).
Punaro weaves a tapestry of crucial 
events in our nation’s history through 
different presidencies—those of Carter, 
Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush 
II—with details available only from 
a congressional insider. Moreover, 
he gives the reader a front-row seat 
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on the development of American 
national security under each of these 
presidents. “As we wrapped up eight 
years of a defense buildup and both 
positive and negative developments, 
from Iran-Contra to the Gorbachev 
era, we thought we had seen it all. But 
we could not imagine the tumult the 
next years would bring” (p. 150).
Perhaps the best chapter is the last: 
“Lessons Learned.” Punaro provides 
a short synopsis of important lessons 
learned throughout his illustrious 
careers in the military, the Senate, 
and private business. These are 
lessons distilled after a lifetime spent 
in leadership positions and working 
with other great leaders. He writes, 
“If today’s leaders could find the 
courage to apply these, they would 
be well on their way to solving most 
of today’s legislative gridlock, finger 
pointing, and failure to act on even 
the most pressing issues” (p. 209).
The book is much more than a col-
lection of autobiographical anecdotes. 
Punaro and his coauthor provide keen 
insights on important national-security 
issues in our nation’s history that many 
of us have never heard before, told from 
a Washington insider’s perspective. This 
book is a must-read for young military 
officers. I wholeheartedly recommend it.
THOMAS J. GIBBONS
“I Am Determined to Live or Die on Board My 
Ship”: The Life of Admiral John Inglis; An Ameri-
can in the Georgian Navy, by Jim Tildesley. Kib-
worth Beauchamp, U.K.: Matador, 2019. 561 
pages. ₤19.99.
This five-hundred-page biography 
is longer than many devoted to the 
world’s most famous admirals. One 
has to search quite carefully in the 
literature on the Royal Navy during 
the American Revolution and the 
wars of the French Revolution to find 
even a passing reference to John Inglis 
(1743–1807). During his forty-two 
years of active naval service, Inglis 
reached the coveted rank of post captain. 
Following his retirement from active 
service in 1799, he rose by seniority up 
the ranks of “yellow” half-pay admirals, 
eventually becoming a vice admiral.
The author of this work, Jim Tildesley, 
former director of the Scottish Maritime 
Museum, has unearthed—with admi-
rable diligence, in more than twenty 
archives in England, Scotland, and 
the United States—the documentary 
evidence of Inglis’s life. The result of 
many years’ labor, Tildesley’s book 
provides a fascinating and lucid 
account that serves as a valuable case 
study of a diligent and successful naval 
officer who retired as a captain.
From other historians, we know that 
two-hundred-some captains were 
serving in the fleet during Inglis’s 
career, and only a small percentage of 
them could rise to flag rank on active 
service; then, as now, reaching the rank 
of captain meant that an officer had 
had a typical successful career. Thus, 
Inglis is part of a significant group of 
career naval officers worthy of study.
Tildesley follows Inglis’s life and career, 
seemingly using every scrap of paper 
that relates to him, his family, and his 
ships, from log- and muster books 
to municipal tax records as well as 
newspapers, estate records, letters from 
family friends and acquaintances, and 
a wide range of official reports. The 
result is a remarkably complete view 
of an ordinary naval captain’s life.
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